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Abstract
Background: The novel avian influenza H7N9 virus has caused severe diseases in humans in eastern China since
the spring of 2013. On January 18th 2014, a doctor working in the emergency department of a hospital in Shanghai
died of H7N9 virus infection. To understand possible reasons to explain this world’s first fatal H7N9 case of a health
care worker (HCW), we summarize the clinical presentation, epidemiological investigations, laboratory results,
and prevention and control policies and make important recommendations to hospital-related workers.
Case presentation: The patient was a 31-year-old male Chinese surgeon who was obese and had a five-year
history of hypertension and suspected diabetes. On January 11th 2014, he showed symptoms of an influenza-like illness.
Four days later, his illness rapidly progressed with bilateral pulmonary infiltration, hypoxia and lymphopenia. On January
17th, the case had a high fever, productive cough, chest tightness and shortness of breath, so that he was administered
with oseltamivir, glucocorticoid, immunoglobulin, and broad-spectrum antibiotic therapy. The case died in the early
morning of next day after invasive ventilation. He had no contact with poultry nor had he visited live-poultry markets
(LPMs), where positive rates of H7N9 were 14.6 % and 18.5 %. Before his illness, he cared for three febrile patients and
had indirect contact with one severe pneumonia patient. Follow-up with 35 close contacts identified two HCWs who
had worked also in emergency department but had not worn masks were anti-H7N9-positive. Viral sequence identity
percentages between the patient and two LPM-H7N9 isolates were fewer than between the patient and another
human case in shanghai in January of 2014.
Conclusions: Important reasons for the patient’s death might include late treatment with oseltamivir, and the infected
H7N9 virus carrying both mammalian-adapted signature (HA-Q226L) and aerosol transmissibility (PB2-D701N). The LPM
he passed every day was an unlikely source of his infection, but a contaminated environment, or an unidentified mild/
asymptomatic H7N9 carrier were more probable. We advocate rigorous standard operating procedures for infection
control practices in hospital settings and evaluations thereafter.
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Background
The first human avian influenza H7N9 case was reported
in Shanghai in February 2013 [1]. By the end of 2013,
Shanghai had 33 laboratory-confirmed human H7N9
cases, with a higher case fatality rate (CFR) than observed
nationally [54.6 % (18/33) versus 32.6 %, (47/144)]. As of
September 27th 2014, Shanghai had an additional 8 cases
with 7 fatalities [CFR in 2014: 87.5 % (7/8) versus 42.2 %,
(125/296)]. Two family clusters were noted in Shanghai,
indicating limited person-to-person transmission [2]. On
January 18th 2014, the first HCW succumbed to H7N9. In
this report, we summarize the clinical presentation, epi-
demiological investigations, laboratory results, and pre-
vention and control policies and make recommendations.
Case presentation
The case under consideration in this article is a 31-year-
old male surgeon working in the emergency department
(ED) of a Pudong hospital in Shanghai (SH-PDH), China.
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He was obese (BMI: 29.39, ≥28 in China [3]), with a five-
year history of hypertension and suspected diabetes, and
was a non-smoker. There was no history of previous drug
or food allergies or blood transfusions.
Clinical history
On January 11th 2014, the patient showed symptoms of an
influenza-like illness (ILI) (fever, cough, sore throat, dizzi-
ness, headache and myalgia) and self-treated with Analgi-
num (Fig. 1). Four days later, the surgeon sought medical
care and took mezlocillin only. From January 11th to January
16th, he continued working (~8 hours a day) at the hospital
until he developed dyspnea. He was not treated with
oseltamivir prior to his admission into SH-PDH intensive-
care-unit (ICU) on January 17th. His illness rapidly pro-
gressed with bilateral pulmonary infiltration, hypoxia and
lymphopenia. Oxygen therapy and mechanical ventilation
were started. Additionally, oseltamivir (75 mg orally and
150 mg intra-gastrically), glucocorticoid, immunoglobulin
and broad-spectrum antibiotics therapy (imipenem and
vancomycin, 1 g intravenously every 12 hours) were ad-
ministered. At 8:00 AM on January 17th, he had a fever
(39 °C), productive cough, chest tightness and shortness
of breath. The white blood cell count was 6.20 × 109/L
with 83.4 % neutrophils and 14.5 % lymphocytes (Table 1).
A computed tomography chest scan showed consolidation
in both lungs (Fig. 2). At 8:47 AM, the patient was given
non-invasive ventilation but he continued to suffer from
hypoxaemia. As his condition worsened, he was started on
invasive ventilation with positive end-expiratory pressure
at 11:28 AM. The patient died of acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome, severe pneumonia, and type I respira-
tory failure at 4:59 AM on January 18th.
Field epidemiology investigation
Retrospective investigation showed that X lived with his
six family members (including his 7-month-pregnant
wife) in a 112-m2-sized house without birds or other
animals. Although he had not visited LPMs, he usually
rode a bicycle to work and passed by the LPM -A where
bird feces were spread on the road near the market gate.
His mother-in-law did grocery shopping at the LPM-B
which is 2.5 miles from X’s home almost every day. One
of his neighbors owned about 14 pigeons. On January
19th-20th, 2014, six pigeon-related samples (2 poultry
feces, 1 throat swab, 1 drinking water, 1 polluted water,
and 1 swab of cage) from X’s neighbor and 68 LPM-
associated samples collected from LPM-related samples
[including throat/anal swabs, and feces of poultry and
environmental specimens (chicken cages, cutting boards,
water from washing poultry flowing on the floor)] were
tested by real-time reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-
reaction (rRT-PCR) [4]. The results showed that the posi-
tive rates of H7N9 were 14.6 % (6/41), 18.5 % (5/27), and
0 % (0/6) from LPM-B-, LPM-A- and pigeon-related speci-
mens, respectively. Ten days before the onset of X’s illness,
all six family members were asymptomatic and no guests
had visited.
At the hospital (SH-PDH), the ED is a 400-m2 U-
shaped emergency room, including six 10-m2-sized
neighboring rooms, where neither windows nor system-
atic regular ventilation system were installed. The ER-A
and ER-C (Fig. 3) consultation rooms were used by the
Departments of Surgery and Internal Medicine, respect-
ively. In the 10 days before disease onset, X took care of
187 surgical patients in ER-A1. Three of X’s patients who
developed febrile illness and recovered completely were
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Contact with X for 8 hours
without PPE
3/1
Had a talk with X for 10
minutes without PPE
A
Passed by LPM-A almost every day;
Took care of 3 febrile patients;
Shared consultation and treatment areas with
two patients who died of COPD and severe
pulmonary infection
Fig. 1 Timeline of the H7N9 patient’s illness, treatment, death and his close contacts. PPE: personal protective equipment
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that two other patients who had sought medical care in
ER-C during January 1st-10th 2014 had also died. One was
a ninety-seven-year-old man with chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease (COPD-1) who arrived at ER-C on January
7th, talked with an ED-internist (Dr.-A1), was immediately
hospitalized [cared for by 3 doctors (Drs.-A2, A3, and A4)
and one nurse (N-A1)], and died the next day. The other
was an eighty-eight-year-old woman with severe pneumo-
nia (SP-1) who went to ER-C on January 5th, consulted an
ED-internist Dr.-B1, was subsequently hospitalized (cared
for by Drs.-B2, B3, and B4, and N-B1), and died on
January 8th from an infection that was not identified. Spec-
imens from 10 persons [COPD-1, SP-1, 8 HCWs except
Dr.-A1 andDr.-B1] were not available for H7N9 tests.
Follow-up of all 10 HCWs who had direct contact with
COPD-1 and SP-1 showed that none of them became ill
(no fever/cough/pneumonia) between January 10th 2014
and January 20th 2014. In addition, both the throat and
blood specimens collected on January 20th from Dr.-A1
and Dr.-B1 in ER-C, who shared the same space or air
with X in ER-A1, were H7N9-negative.
Identification and Tracing of close contacts
In our investigation of human-to-human transmission,
we defined close contacts of X as those who had direct
contact but without taking any personal protective
equipment (PPE) between January 11th and January 18th.
In total, 35 close contacts of X were identified for daily
monitoring, including 9 family members (3 visited
him at the hospital but lived separately) and 26
HCWs [11, 10, 2, and 3 from ED, ICU, radiology, and sup-
porting staff, respectively]. None had respiratory or other
H7N9-related symptoms within 10 days of their last ex-
posure to X. On January 20th, we collected throat swabs
for rRT-PCR, and all samples were H7N9-negative. Since
Table 1 Clinical characteristics of the 31-year-old-case
Characteristics Patient














Shortness of breath Yes -
Dyspnea No (at 3:00 AM)
but Yes (at 8:00 AM)
on January 17th
-
Chest pain No -




Skin ecchymosis No -
Coma Yes -
Blood cell count
White blood cell 6.2 × 109/L 3.5-9.5 x109 cells/L
Neutrophils 83.4 % 50.0 %-70.0 %
Lymphocytes 14.5 % 20.0 %-40.0 %
Blood gas analysis
PH 7.4 7.4-7.5
PO2 42.9 mmHg 83.0-108.0 mmHg
PCO2 31.7 mmHg 22.0-29.0 mmHg







Septic shock No -




Acute renal damage No -
Encephalopathy No -




Table 1 Clinical characteristics of the 31-year-old-case
(Continued)
Secondary infections No -
Treatment







Antibiotic therapy Mezlocillin, imipenem
and vancomycin
-
Antiviral agent Oseltamivir -




Mechanical ventilation Positive end
expiratory pressure
-
Pan et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:237 Page 3 of 8
serological surveillance provides more information on
total infection, we then tested serum samples collected
from all 35 close contacts by haemagglutination inhibition
(HAI) assay [5], using influenza A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9)
virus as a viral antigen and horse red blood cells. Further-
more, the two anti-H7N9-positive HCWs were investi-
gated in detail. The HCW with a serotiter of 1:40 against
the H7N9 virus was a 37-year-old male ED surgeon (Y),
and the other one with a serotiter of 1:20 was a 30-year-
old male ED internist (Z). These three HCWs (X, Y, and
Z) did not care for the same patient from January 1st to
January 17th. They had never worked in the ICU and did
not have any overlapping encounters with patients of
COPD-1 and SP-1. X and Y had worked together but had
not worn masks in ER-A1 for two days (8 hours/day) on
January 3rd and 15th January (4 days after the onset of X’s
illness). In addition, X talked with Z in ER-B1 (for emer-
gency handling of patients) for 10 minutes without their
masks at 3:00 AM on January 17th before being admitted
to the ICU. Sixteen environmental samples were collected
from ER-A1 (the surface of telephone receiver, printer,
work table, and medical waste), ER-B2 (rails of hospital
beds, oxygen humidifier, sputum aspirator surface, ECG
monitor wall, outer surface of IV stand), and ICU (ECG
monitor wall, surface of blood pressure meter, outer
surface of sputum aspirator, Infusion pump surface,
stethoscope surface and rails of hospital beds). They were
H7N9-negative by rRT-PCR.
Virology and associated molecular investigations
On January 18th 2014, the throat swab of X collected on
the day of death was sent to Shanghai Municipal Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, and confirmed as
H7N9 by rRT-PCR on January 19th. Phylogenetic analysis
for all eight H7N9 viral genomic segments was performed
by both neighbour-joining (NJ) and maximum-likelihood
(ML) methods with MEGA version 5.10. The reliability of
the unrooted tree was assessed by bootstrap with 1000
replications. Bootstrap values greater than 60 % are shown
for selected nodes. All the nucleotide sequences of the
eight viral gene segments of X’s H7N9 virus (A/Shanghai/
PD-02/2014, PD-2) are available at GenBank with the
following accession numbers: KJ549801 (PB2), KJ549802
(PB1), KJ549803 (PA), KJ195797 (HA), KJ195798 (NP),
KJ195799 (NA), KJ195800 (M), KJ195801 (NS).
The eight viral genes shared between X’s H7N9 virus
(A/Shanghai/PD-02/2014, PD-2) and the avian-origin
H7N9 virus isolates from the two LPMs in this study (A/
Chicken/Shanghai/PD-CN-02/2014, CN-2 and A/Environ-
ment/Shanghai/PD-JZ-01/2014, JZ-1) revealed nucleic
Fig. 2 Representative radiographic findings of the laboratory-confirmed 31-year-old Shanghai surgeon infected with H7N9 influenza. Chest radiograph
of this patient was taken at 7 days after onset of symptoms, showing bilateral pulmonary infiltrates of airspace consolidation and severe consolidation
in the left lobe
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acid sequence identity percentages ranging from 97.8 % to
99.5 % (Table 2), in which the percentages of the PA gene
ranked lowest (97.9 %, 97.8 %). However, the overall viral
sequence identity was higher (ranging 98.1 % ~ 99.7 %) be-
tween the two Shanghai human cases, PD-2 and PD-1 (A/
Shanghai/PD-01/2014, PD-1), while PD-1 was another
non-epidemiologically linked H7N9 human case that was
also confirmed in January in SH-PD. Similarly, viral se-
quence patterns for all the eight individual genes were also
closer between PD-2 and PD-1 than those between PD-2
and CN-2 or JZ-1. GenBank accession numbers of PD-2,
JZ-1, and CN-2 are as follows: PB2 (KJ549799, KJ549791,
KJ549783), PB1 (KJ195791, KJ549792, KJ549784), PA
(KJ549800, KJ549793, KJ549785), HA (KJ195792, KJ549794,
KJ549786), NP (KJ195793, KJ549795, KJ549787), NA
(KJ195794, KJ549796, KJ549788), M (KJ195795, KJ549797,
KJ549789), NS (KJ195796, KJ549798, KJ549790).
The phylogenetic tree topology was the same, using ML
and NJ methods; hence the results of MJ tree are displayed
in Fig. 4. The results showed that all the four genes (HA,
NA, M and NS) of PD-2 clustered with PD-1 (i.e. the
same sub-lineage) whereas the two LPM-derived H7N9
isolates belonged to another sub-lineage. HA, PA, PB2,
and NP of JZ-1 are at the same branch as those of PD-2.
The PD-2 had more amino acid changes from avian to hu-
man signatures, with markers of mammalian-host adapta-
tion [1], such as HA-Q226L HA-G228S (H3 numbering),
and PB2-E627K. In contrast, CN-2 and JZ-1 isolates kept
one avian-associated molecular signature with no change
at PB2-E627 among these three amino acids. For clinical
concern, the PD-2 virus was still oseltamivir-sensitive
(NA-E119 [6], R292 [5], and N294 [1]) but Amantadine-
resistant (M2-S31N) [1, 7]. Most importantly, of these four
SH-H7N9 viruses, only the PD-2 possessed PB2-D701N
Fig. 3 Spatial distribution of the six consultation rooms in the emergency department of the Pudong Hospital. ” ”: door of consultation room; ER:
emergency room; H7N9-(+) patient X and his close contact Y worked in ER-A1. In addition, X and another close contact Z worked in ER-C1. The COPD-1
visited ER-C on January 7 and SP-1 visited ER-C on January 5. ER-B1 is used for emergency handling and case management of the patients from ER-A and
ER-C, shared by the two departments of Surgery and Internal Medicine. ER-B2 was used for cleaning trauma by ED-surgeons. Surgeons in ER-A generally
did not wear oral masks
















PB2 97.9 98.9 99.1 reference
PB1 99.4 99.0 99.7
PA 97.9 97.8 98.1
HA 99.1 99.4 99.5
NP 99.5 99.1 99.7
NA 98.8 98.6 99.3
M 98.3 98.4 98.4
NS 99.2 99.2 99.4
PD-2: the surgeon’s H7N9 isolate; PD-1: another human case in the same district
of Pudong as the PD-2 case; CN-2 and JZ-1: the two environmental H7N9 isolates
obtained from the two live-bird markets. LPM-A is located at 200 meters from his
hospital. LPM-B is the market (2.5 miles from his home) that the surgeon’s
mother-in-law visited almost every day.
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(aerosol transmissibility in ferrets) [8, 9], which has
public health significance.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of
the Shanghai Municipal Center for Disease Control and
Prevention.
Conclusions
We describe the world’s first case of a health care worker
who died of H7N9 at the age of 31. This is much younger
than the median age of 64 in 172 fatal H7N9 cases in
China. Undoubtedly, the death of this young doctor could
have several explanations. These include the fact that he
suffered from hypertension, diabetes, and obesity. As of
September 27th 2014, these three underlying conditions
were also present in 27.3 %, 11.1 %, and 10.7 % of 172 fatal
H7N9 cases (131 with BMI data) in China, respectively.
Obesity was also a risk factor contributing to the severity of
the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic cases in China and
other areas [10–12]. Perhaps more importantly, the patient
was late to seek treatment (4 days after disease onset) [2]
since he was unaware of his infection with H7N9. As a re-
sult, treatment with oseltamivir was not begun until 6 days
after the onset of illness, a time when the drug would be in-
effective [13]. Additionally, of critical importance, the pa-
tient was infected with a H7N9 virus that contained a
mammalian-adapted signature (HA-Q226L), a mutation at
PB2-D701N which facilitated its aerosol transmission as
well as virulence markers (PB2-627 K and HA-G228S) [1,
14]. Taken together, along with the fact that the doctor had
been working a seven-day shift with little rest since the on-
set of his disease, his lymphopenia indicating abnormal im-
munity [13, 15], and possibly unidentified accumulated
exposures, these factors could explain the fatality at such a
young age.
Identifying the source of infection is important to under-
stand how the case may have acquired his H7N9 infection.
The high positive rates of H7N9 at the two LPMs (14.6 %
and 18.5 %) suggest that the H7N9 virus might be contam-
inating the markets and surrounding areas, providing po-
tential for spread of the virus to the LPMs workers and/or
shoppers. However, phylogenetic results did not indicate an
LPM-A-oriented infection source; even X passed the en-
trance of LPM-A every day. Because four genes (HA, PA,
PB2, NP) of JZ-1 clustered with PD-2, X’s infection might
originate from LPM-B; but X wasn’t exposed directly to the
environment and poultry from PLM-B. X’s mother in law
might carry H7N9 virus to X’s home through the contami-
nated water in LPM-B. Finally, there is still some uncer-
tainty about avian-origin since LPM-related specimens
were taken after, rather than before, his death.
On the hospital side, environmental specimens were
taken after thorough clean-up. Unfortunately, specimens
Fig. 4 Phylogenetic relationships of the eight full-length genes of A/Shanghai/PD-02/2014. Horizontal distances are proportional to the genetic
distance. Three colors represent the three different types of the sources of H7N9 viruses: (1) the A/Shanghai/PD-02/2014 (H7N9) virus was isolated
from this young surgeon (X) is shown in red, (2) the A/Shanghai/PD-01/2014 (H7N9) virus was isolated from another PD patient in January without
epidemiological linkage is shown in green, and (3) H7N9 viruses from the two LPMs are shown in blue. A/Chicken/Shanghai/PD-CN-02/2014 virus was
isolated from the LPM-A near H7N9-(+) patient X’s hospital. A/Environment/ Shanghai/ PD-JZ-01/2014) was isolated from the LPM-B closer to H7N9-(+)
patient X’s home
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from the three febrile patients cared for by X and the
two fatal cases (COPD-1 and SP-1) were not available.
Most importantly, the positive anti-H7N9 HCWs (Y and
Z) from the serological surveillance demonstrated that
contaminated environment-to-human or human-to-
human transmission in a hospital setting is likely [16] if
HCWs did not have appropriate PPE while caring for in-
fected patients. The low HAI serotiter of Z might be due
to a shorter exposure. None of the six family members
of X (including his 7-month-pregnant wife) were in-
fected, showing that the person-to-person transmissibil-
ity within this family setting was still limited. The source
of infection was not identified. The LPM-A was an un-
likely source, but a contaminated environment, or an
unidentified mild/asymptomatic H7N9 carrier were
more probable.
To minimize the health threat to citizens [17], the
Shanghai Government announced the closure of LPMs
from January 31st to April 30th 2014. There have been
no H7N9 cases in Shanghai since February. Based on
our experience, we recommend: (1) during epidemics of
H7N9, those HCWs who might be exposed to H7N9
cases are advised to take oseltamivir or other available
drugs against H7N9 viruses in advance; (2) implement-
ing rigorous standard operating procedures for infection
control practices, including PPE, traffic control [17], and
evaluations thereafter; (3) enhancing surveillance by
reporting of any HCWs who develop ILI; (4) avoiding
possible cross-transmission among HCWs, patients, and
visitors, particularly the immunocompromised and/or
those with other co-morbidities [18, 19]; and (5) during
H7N9 epidemics, H7N9 tests need to be performed on
all severe cases of respiratory infection, severe pneumo-
nia cases in particular, even these cases have no obvious
epidemiologic exposures.
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